ŽDANOKA v. LATVIA (No. 2), (Application no. 42221/18), 25 July 2024
Citation: ŽDANOKA v. LATVIA (No. 2), (Application no. 42221/18), 25 July 2024
Rule of thumb: Is banning of a person from being allowed to run as a candidate in a national election to the country’s Parliament due to past organisation of an extremist group, a violation of Protocol 1, Article 3, Right to Democracy? This is prima facie an interference with this right, but, no, it is not necessarily a violation if the country can justify it. If this was a particularly extremist group which still poses a threat to society then this can be justified & not deemed to be a violation of Protocol 1, Article 3.
Facts: The basic facts of this case were that Zdanoka had been a prominent member of the Soviet Union Communist Party, an extremist group which indeed sought to & did severely violate a multitude of human rights of citizens in Latvia. When this party fell from power in Latvia in the early – mid 1990’s, and free market democracy was implemented as the social system, Latvian citizens who were part of that party were forbidden from being allowed to run as MP’s to try to prevent that system from being reintroduced. Zdanoka challenged this before as a violation of the ECHR and was unsuccessful. Almost 30 years later, Zdanoka sought to run again as a member of Parliament. The Latvian Government stated that the ban was still in place. Zdanoka again argued that this was a violation of Protocol 1, Article 3, the Right to Democracy.
Judgment:
The Court held that although this was an interference with Protocol 1, Article 3, this was not a violation in this case. They affirmed that the annexing of states by Russia still remained a problem in the region, so this although an interference with this right, this was not a disproportionate interference to constitute a violation of the right with the margin of appreciation applying.
’61. … Later, in 2018, the Constitutional Court narrowed down the restriction by adding a new criterion of “[having] endangered and still continuing] to endanger the independence of the Latvian State and the principles of a democratic State governed by the rule of law”, developed an individualised assessment of each candidate’s “dangerousness”, and confirmed the powers of the Central Electoral Commission to carry out that assessment (see paragraph 16 above). In the present case, however, the applicant has not shown why and in what manner the reasoning of the Central Electoral Commission was arbitrary, ultra vires, or contrary to the law. It is true that the wording of the Central Electoral Commission’s decision of 21 August 2018, which was itself based on the annual reports of the Security Police and on other information provided by State security agencies, might be seen as somewhat vague and lacking in specificity as to which of the applicant’s activities are considered by the domestic authorities to endanger Latvia’s independence and democratic order (paragraph 19 above). However, in the specific circumstances of the case and given the public profile of the applicant, including her support of the Russian Federation’s actions in the Crimean Peninsula, the Court admits that the reasons given by the Commission are sufficient for the purposes of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 (see and compare, mutatis mutandis, Kirkorov v. Lithuania (dec.), no. 12174/22, § 63, 19 March 2024, where the Court took note of the relevant Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly resolutions and found that the assessment of the domestic authorities was not arbitrary or without basis). Finally, the Court notes that the applicant was able to lodge an appeal with the Regional Administrative Court, which, in adversarial proceedings, found that the Commission had acted within its competence. With regard to the alleged procedural shortcomings in those proceedings, in particular the use of classified evidence, the Court notes that the Regional Administrative Court permitted the applicant’s representative to consult a report document that had previously been confidential (see paragraphs 21-22 above). The applicant has failed to explain how exactly this or any other alleged shortcoming affected her rights and the outcome of the case. In sum, the Court is satisfied that those proceedings afforded the applicant sufficient procedural safeguards against arbitrariness.
62. Having regard to all the above, in particular, given that the general context of the case has changed and that the legal basis for the impugned restriction has been narrowed down by the Constitutional Court in 2018 and applied accordingly by the Central Electoral Commission (see paragraphs 52, 58 and 61 above) since the Grand Chamber’s judgment in 2006, the Court is satisfied that, by disqualifying the applicant from standing for parliamentary election, the Latvian authorities did not overstep their margin of appreciation. It follows that there has been no violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 in this case’.
Judges: Mattias Guyomar, President; Carlo Ranzoni; Mārtiņš Mits; María Elósegui; Kateřina Šimáčková; Mykola Gnatovskyy; Stéphane Pisani.
Warning: This is not professional legal advice. This is not professional legal education advice. Please obtain professional guidance before embarking on any legal course of action. This is just an interpretation of a Judgment by persons of legal insight & varying levels of legal specialism, experience & expertise. Please read the Judgment yourself and form your own interpretation of it with professional assistance.