Her Majesty's Attorney General v Crosland [2021] UKSC 15 (10 May 2021)
Citation:Her Majesty's Attorney General v Crosland [2021] UKSC 15 (10 May 2021).
Subjects invoked: 85. 'Criminal 4 - Public disorder'.
Rule of thumb:If you get a draft Court Judgment marked ‘confidential’, and you release this early, are you committing a crime? Yes, the Court in this case affirmed the principle of ‘the early release of confidential draft Court Judgements issued to the representatives in a case is a criminal act of contempt of Court’.
Background facts:
This case invoked the criminal subject of public disorder.
The facts of this case were fairly simple. The UK Supreme Court issued a draft Judgement to the parties’ representatives in the Court case involving Greenpeace’s challenge to the new Heathrow Airport on the basis of environmental global warming arguments before the final Judgement was formally released. It was stated on this Judgement that it was ‘strictly confidential’. The barrister acting for Greenpeace, Timothy Crosland, chose to release this draft Judgement and ignore the fact that it was strictly confidential.
Mr Crosland sought to argue that there was not sufficient intent on his behalf in releasing this to constitute criminal behaviour. Mr Crosland further tried to argue that due to the serious nature global warming the defence of necessity and duress of circumstances entitled to him to take this measure. He further argued that his human rights under Article 2 (right to life) and Article 10 (right to freedom of expression) were violated by the Judgement entitling him to take this measure. The prosecution argued that it was a blatant, deliberate & indefensible crime with all Crosland’s defences being vexatious.
Judgment:
The Court upheld that Crosland committed a contempt of Court criminal offence in doing this. The Court firstly held that there was a quote from him stating that he knew he would be prosecuted for releasing the Judgement as he knew this was contempt of Court, meaning that this was clearly a deliberate act of civil disobedience by him. It was then held by the Court that there was no rational connection between his duress arguments and global warming – he was not in immediate danger which is needed for this defence to succeed. The Court further held that they did not see how his life was actively and imminently in danger under Article 2. The Court further held that the interference with his right to freedom of speech under Article 10 was a lawful interference as the confidential sending of draft Court Judgement with arguments and suggestions was an important Court process to be upheld. The Court affirmed that interfering with this important part of process was a serious act of disorder that representatives in cases had to respect for the Court to function properly and respectably. In short, for disclosing the draft Judgement early in breach of the Court confidentiality order Crosland was deemed to have committed a public disorder criminal offence. The Court deemed the punishment for this criminal disorder offence to be a £5,000 fine for Crosland.
Ratio-decidendi:
‘45. Turning to the present case, in terms of culpability this was an interference with the administration of justice sufficiently serious to constitute a criminal contempt of court. The embargo on publication was intended to protect the operation of the legal system. The breach of the embargo was carried out intentionally and in full knowledge of the prohibition on disclosure. 47. The respondent was motivated by his concerns and fears relating to the consequences of global warming and his disagreement with the decision of the Supreme Court. However, this does not begin to justify his conduct. There is no principle which justifies treating the conscientious motives of a protester as a licence to flout court orders with impunity’.
‘Any penalty imposed must be necessary for the legitimate objective of maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary and must be proportionate for that purpose. ...We also take into account that the respondent is of positive good character. In these circumstances, we propose to deal with this matter by the imposition of a fine. In coming to a conclusion as to the appropriate level of fine, we have taken account of the fact that the respondent faces disciplinary proceedings before his professional body. We have also taken account of what the respondent has told us about his income. We therefore impose a fine of £5,000’, Lord Lloyd-Jones, Lord Hamblen and Lord Stephens at 50-52.
Warning: This is not professional legal advice. This is not professional legal education advice. Please obtain professional guidance before embarking on any legal course of action. This is just an interpretation of a Judgment by persons of legal insight & varying levels of legal specialism, experience & expertise. Please read the Judgment yourself and form your own interpretation of it with professional assistance.