A and B v Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority & Anor [2021] UKSC 27 (9 July 2021)
Citation:A and B v Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority & Anor [2021] UKSC 27 (9 July 2021).
Subjects invoked: 101. 'State aid/funding'.
Rule of thumb:In interpreting legislation which awards people state funding, does the exact letter have of the legislation have to be met in order for people to qualify for it? Yes, in order for people to meet the requirements for state funding, they have to be meet the exact criteria set in the Act or Regulation – there is no scope for creativity for the decision maker in deciding these – state funding is a super-strict statutory interpretation exercise.
Background facts:
This case invoked the subject of state funding, specifically criminal injury compensation.
The facts of this case were that A and B were young ladies from Lithuania. They were trafficked into the UK to be used for prostitution, and they were used as prostitutes in the UK. A and B claimed that they were led to believe that they would get jobs doing other things, and this turned out to be a lie. They were then left with the situation that they basically had to be sex-slaves prostitutes with no independence in order to survive in the UK. A and B applied to the criminal injuries compensation authority for damages done to them through this criminal act. The Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority refused the applications from A and B – they stated that they were not being given any damages for this. A and B applied to the Court for a judicial review of this decision.
The Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority (CICA) argued that the criminal injuries compensation fund was a statutory aid/grants fund. CICA argued that with all Government grants, the principle which applied to it was ‘strict interpretation of the statutory conditions’ – there was no real common law underpinning this law subject, with statutes and regulations having to be studied carefully to see if an applicant meets absolutely all of the conditions. CICA argued that A and B had deliberately and illegally entered the UK which was a criminal act, and they had also partaken in a prostitution ring which was a criminal act. There was no evidence of them being held prisoner which meant they had a chance to leave this criminal enterprise and go to the police in the UK, which they never did. They also had a further criminal record beyond this. CICA argued that the rules of the criminal injuries compensation fund that no one with a criminal record which has not yet expired, or who has been involved in criminal activity at the time when other criminal injuries were inflicted on them, was not entitled to compensation. CICA argued that these rules clearly prevented A and B from being awarded compensation.
A and B argued that when the interpretation of these rules was supplemented with human rights they gave a different outcome. A and B argued that they had suffered serious mental and physical injuries as a result of this, and A and B argued that they were in an extremely vulnerable position and were grossly exploited - they argued that serious injuries like these required a more lax interpretation of the rules. They argued that when these rules were supplemented with their human right not to be discriminated against for being sex-workers they were entitled to compensation. A and B further argued that if this interpretation was not taken then these state aid/funding/grants rules were a violation of the human right not to be discriminated against.
Judgment:
The Court upheld the arguments of CICA in this matter. They affirmed that the CICA fund statutory rules and regulations did indeed prevent A and B from being entitled to compensation due to A and B’s clear links with crime – it was a clear condition of any grant that the applicant had no unexpired criminal record and no involvement in crime, and A and B as applicants did not meet many of these conditions. The Court also ruled that they could not see a strong and clear enough case of discrimination being made out with the CIC state aid rules. These rules applied equally to sex workers in the UK and abroad, and to all people involved in all criminal activity - not just prostitution. A and B did not make a persuasive enough case to the UK Supreme Court about the CIC state grants rules being a violation of human rights. In short, the Court affirmed that ladies who are trafficked to the UK to be used as prostitutes are not entitled to compensation from the UK taxpayers’ public funds for this.
Ratio-decidendi:
90. Can a bright line rule be justified in the context of this compensation scheme? In my view it clearly can. First, we are concerned with an area of policy in which a considerable degree of latitude is accorded to the legislator as to the form and scope of the CICS. Secondly, the object of the CICS, namely the allocation of limited resources to deserving victims of crime as an expression of public sympathy, is such that the legislator is entitled to adopt a scheme which operates by clearly defined rules. In particular, it is appropriate to lay down rules as to the seriousness of offences which will disqualify possible claimants as opposed to allowing a general discretion to be applied in individual cases by claims officers. The chosen approach has the considerable advantages of clarity and consistency. Thirdly, it is significant that the CICS was approved by Parliament following an extensive process of consultation and an equality impact assessment. The government did consider the extent to which there should be a discretion exercisable in individual cases and decided to retain such a discretion in respect of unspent convictions for minor offences within paragraph 4 of Annex D but not in respect of more serious unspent offences which resulted in a custodial or community sentence within paragraph 3. I consider that it was perfectly entitled to adopt such an approach. 91. In any event, the rules adopted in Annex D are, as both Wilkie J and the Court of Appeal pointed out, nuanced rules reflecting in various ways both the seriousness and the age of a claimant’s previous conviction. 92. I consider, therefore, that the difference in treatment on grounds of other status resulting from Annex D is justified. The measure has the legitimate objective of limiting eligibility to compensation to those deserving of it.’ Lord Lloyd-Jones at 90-94
’Can a bright line rule be justified in the context of this compensation scheme? In my view it clearly can… The chosen approach has the considerable advantages of clarity and consistency’, Lord Lloyd-Jones at 90
Warning: This is not professional legal advice. This is not professional legal education advice. Please obtain professional guidance before embarking on any legal course of action. This is just an interpretation of a Judgment by persons of legal insight & varying levels of legal specialism, experience & expertise. Please read the Judgment yourself and form your own interpretation of it with professional assistance.